By Emmanuel O. Ojelabi
State-threatening insecurity challenges have increased in Nigeria in the last decade, from insurgency and Islamist terrorism in the northeast; banditry and kidnapping in the northwest; militancy in the Southsouth; and a growing insurrection in the southeast born out of a rekindled and intense call for secession in that region over the past six years. Per usual, Abuja’s instinctive strategy to address this issue in the southeast is the regular hawkish strategy of heavy clampdowns and indiscriminate killings without full regards for the rule of law; or a meaningful attempt to address the cause of the conflict with an underlining view of peacebuilding. Sadly, this has resulted in many needless causalities indicating that Nigeria has learnt little or no lessons from the sad events of 1967-1970 despite Gowon’s very emotional post-war speech espousing a united, consequently stronger and better Nigeria. This brief appraisal of the events of the past few years, argues that the growing insecurity in the southeast is a consequence of a ‘historical memory of societal trauma’ reaching back to the Biafran war, its preservation through; an unfair, continued militarization of the region, its accompanying inflictions and emotional literature, a developed sense of marginalization, consequent reaction of southeasterners, and the resultant counterreaction of Abuja with a reputably disastrous repressive strategy inherited from colonialism. It warns of a cataclysm if this continuum is not altered timeously.
A very short history
The Nigeria Civil War was fought amidst a torrid history between 1966 and 1970. Three years of attrition between the asymmetric forces of the Supreme Federal Government (SFG) of Nigeria and the Southeastern people of the country who adopted the name Biafra. Surprisingly, the war lasted for 24 months not because of the professional restraints of the SFG forces but for the audacity of the Biafran forces reinforced by factors such as the externalization of the war during the western cold war. The immediate grievance of the war was the unfortunate and barbaric killings of thousands of Easterners “mostly Igbos” in the Northern parts of the country in retaliation for a perceived Igbo coup earlier in 1966 which took the lives of very important figures mostly among the northern civilian and military elites and a few in the south.
“Operation Araba” which was historically the northern elites’ third attempt to leave Nigeria since 1953, changed to Gowon’s “one indivisible Nigeria” after much intervention from Westminster and Washington. In what could have been a dialogue around democratic referendums, talks failed as political actors pursued exclusive interests on an agreeable state structure, the south southern oil, and access to the sea. Consequent to the war, millions were lost in lives in approximately 100 and 3 million on the SFG and Biafran sides respectively. The war left an indelibly bitter mark in the social consciousness of Igbos, and enduring is the trauma of such societal memory.
Subsequently
Governments under the fear of widespread Igbo resentment kept the region under heavy militarization and strict repressive policing and the situation brought adversities and brutality upon Southeasterners. Many expressed: “it is as if the war has not ended”. Further preserving this history of societal trauma are the works of Igbo intellectuals viz, Chimamanda Adichie and Chinua Achebe in their books “Half of the yellow sun” and “There was a country” respectively. These emotional attempts at preserving a history the Nigerian government had rather deliberately, “kept in the dark corners” of the Nigerian socio-political memory, perhaps informed young literate Igbos the reason why their streets are so besieged by intimidation and brutality. Both literature paint grim pictures of the civil war with interesting debates on discursive issues such as; whether the Igbo pogroms of 1966 were a fair price for the controversial January 1966 coup. More intense conversations grew in Igbo circles on how the Igbo nation is still paying for the events of 1966-1970 in a Nigerian state that has continually reminded them of their “liminal citizenship”.
The situation worsened post-2015 with the emergence of a repressive, close-minded, ethnized Federal Government (FG) followed by the countrywide escalation of conflict between pastoralists and farming communities. The blatant disregard for law and order by these weapon-wielding herders found its way to the Southeastern parts and complaints were met with laxity by the FG. Surprising phrases like “tolerance” for neighbours, “politicization” of the conflict, “misrepresentation of facts”, and “accommodation” of fellow countrymen characterised the “travailously-achieved” comments from the presidency. Thoughts, therefore, grew of an enduring Igbo hate highlighted by brazen attacks on Igbo communities by northern pastoralists coupled with the partial sidelining of Igbos from the Nigerian federal politics since 1966. The optics became of a northern-dominated FG tolerant to an erring northern aggressor group. Igbo activists and agitation groups such as Ohanaeze Ndigbo and Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOP) found their voices anew to condemn the activities of the Nigerian security operatives and the marauding herdsmen in their region and more virulent groups like the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) arose as a dangerously ethnicized pressure group to revive the history of 1967 Biafra and demand for the liberation of the Igbo people in the face of insecurity and the “inability of the Nigerian State to protect the Igbo nation”. Sounds familiar?
Strategies deployed
As a common response since the colonial periods till date, the proven misbegotten “state repression” strategy was adopted by Abuja. Since 2017 both government forces and local belligerents have painted with blood on the canvas of Imo and Abia States. Several “community meetings”, “association gatherings” and ‘family meetings’ were invaded and desecrated with the blood of innocent “Nigerian” citizens whose only sin was having the misfortune of aspiring for “self-determination” and freedom of association. News broke daily of an invasion of a meeting held by members of IPOB or MASSOP wherein “numerous” people were killed. In response before December 2020, IPOB and others only explored protests, rallies, strikes and boycotts as political tools of expressing their grievances.
“Numerous”, this term is being used sparingly here because while it was captured live on several cameras as the Nigerian Army opened fire, even life rounds, on protesting citizens on the sad night of the 20th October 2020. It took the FG several months to admit that the event “may have” happened and then the next debate was whether or not there was a “massacre”. There is no doubt we have an impossibly deceitful Government who will rather visit Nigerians with vicious force than move to calm nerves or listen to reason.
FG declared IPOB a terrorist group without any anti-state assaults in 2017 and used the instrumentality of the court as well as the Igbo political elites (majorly the Governors) to proscribe it; effectively driving the group underground and passing a clear message of a repressive and indifferent FG-Igbo relationship. This was done at a time when cries from the Middle-belt and Southern parts of the country lamenting the baneful activities of some Fulani herdsmen and demanding their proscription and gazetting as a terrorist group was utterly ignored by the FG. Instead, a bromance was entrenched between Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN), representing the marauding pastoralists, and the FG and subsequent nebulous legislation favourable to the demands of MACBAN emerged from the presidency to the dismay of Nigerians. This explains why IPOB and other southern agitation groups gained much public support from their communities. IPOB’s proscription was followed by a much more lethal militarization of the Southeast through “Op. Python Dance”. It is descriptively acknowledged among social circles that even the more-destabilized north is not as besieged by military occupational presence and intimidation as the Southeastern parts. This state of affairs led to the militarization of IPOB in 2020 with the emergence of the Eastern Security Network (ESN) which had the clear aim of insurgency or in the least, militancy.
Even though denied by IPOB and ESN, apparent insurgent groups have dealt deadly blows against the state in the Southeastern States of Abia, Imo, Anambra, Ebonyi among others adopting “hit and run” guerilla strategies, attacking security bases, checkpoints, formations, and prisons, deploying sophisticated guns and IEDs. The police and army in response have also commenced underground operations visiting confirmed and suspected IPOB and ESN members with summary executions, random raids, checkpoint shootings, and aerial bombings. Both sides have adopted propaganda deploying social media to their respective advantages.
E.O. Ojelabi, M.A. can be @: ojelabiemmanuel@ymail.com
Lessons from history
