From Yemen to Sudan

By Mohammed isa

In October this year, the US Embassy in Yemen is expected to mark the fifth anniversary of the unlawful detention of US Embassy Yemeni staff in Sana’a, the state capital, by the Iran-backed Houthi terrorist organization. The Houthis (Ansar Alla), is a Shia Zaidis political and religious movement from northern Yemen that seized the state capital in 2024, ousting the government and igniting a war.

A statement attributed to the US Embassy stated that the Yemeni government has the right to end the Houthis’ capacity to engage in terrorism. The U.S. government designates the Houthis as terrorists. Interestingly, US officials have engaged in diplomatic communication (including meetings in Oman) where the Houthis assured Washington that they would not target American vessels in the Red Sea.

In Yemen, the blatant double standards governing many aspects of US policy towards crises in Sudan become strikingly apparent. While Washington condemns the Houthi group, describing it as terrorist and taking political, military, and economic measures against it, American language towards the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia in Sudan appears far more ambiguous and at times more accommodating, despite the militia’s long record of violations and crimes against Sudanese civilians.

The more pressing question is: Why do violence and terrorism become sufficient grounds for war, designation and sanctions when the perpetrator is Houthi, while the same violence becomes merely ’part of a conflict’ when the perpetrator is the RSF?

If Washington’s standard is the protection of civilians, why should that standard be unequally applied to all parties perpetrating the violence? And if the US says it is working for peace in Sudan, how can that peace be just if it does not begin by establishing responsibility for crimes and holding those who committed them accountable, rather than placing the aggressor and the defender of the state on the same footing?

In Yemen, the US has treated the Houthis as security and political threat extending beyond Yemen’s borders. Attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, together with threats linked to Israel’s security and US interests, have led Washington to regard the group as part of a regional threat network that cannot be treated lightly. It has therefore not hesitated to use highly forceful language or take direct action against it.

But the problem begins when self – defense principle is transformed from a general rule into a selective instrument – applied to one party while suspended or diluted when another party is involved. Perhaps the US policy does not always move according to a combination of strategic interests, regional alliances and calculations of influence.

Sudan’s conflict is not a matter of isolated incident or a political disagreement that can be contained through negotiations. The country is facing a war started by the RSF that has created one of the world’s largest humanitarian catastrophes, displaced millions of Sudanese, destroyed cities and infrastructure, and opened the door to widespread violations against civilians.

The RSF is not simply a political group at odds with the government, nor is it a military institution that can be equated with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) as two equal parties to a political conflict, as some claim. But an armed formation that originally emerged from the demonic Janjaweed militia, then developed into a massive military force.

In Yemen, the Houthis have become an unmistakable adversary of the US and Western interests in the Middle East. They form part of a regional axis that Washington regards as a competitor and a threat to its principal ally, Israel. Their attacks on international shipping also directly affect their economic and security interests.

Sudan, by contrast, presents a far more complex picture. It is a resource-rich country with an exceptionally important strategic location at the intersection of the Horn of Africa, Red Sea, and the Arab world, and so its conflict involves multiple regional and international interests.

Peace based on redistributing political roles among armed actors and their political supporters does not address the roots of the crisis. It merely reproduces the crisis in a new form. The US envoy, Massad Boulos, who has become a link in implementing US policies in Sudan insists on holding the Sudanese Armed Forces responsible for prolonging the war, or allegations against it without producing a single piece of evidence to substantiate them, while RSF is treated as a political actor that can be incorporated into a future settlement, despite alleged violations against it, supported by evidence that cannot be dismissed.

More troubling still is that the US policy is seeking political channels through which to grant RSF indirect legitimacy, via civilian entities aligned with its political positions or providing it with political cover. Boulos’s role appears closer to reshaping the Sudanese political landscape in accordance with a particular political conception than to that of a mediator seeking to address the roots of the conflict.

If the US is serious about helping Sudan emerge from the war, it must apply the same standard to Sudan that it applies elsewhere. The most dangerous thing Washington could do in Sudan is to pursue a quick peace at any cost, ignoring the roots of the conflict, treating armed force as a legitimate route to power, and using certain civilian fronts to provide political cover for that approach.

When Sudanese see a group classified as terrorists in one place being given a different description by Washington in another, the message they receive is not one of peace, but a clear one that says that the standard is not the crime itself, but where the perpetrator stands in relation to the balance of American interests.

This double standards do not only harm Sudan and the victims of the war alone but damages the credibility of American policy and undermines the confidence of any American role that claims to seek sustainable peace in Sudan.

Isa writes from Ilorin.