Lawyers criticise rationale of LPDC decision against J-K Gadzama

By Kachi E Agwu

The Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee (‘LPDC’) delivered a landmark ruling on 29 July 2026, suspending Mr Ocha P. Ulegede from legal practice for two years and Chief Joe-Kyari Gadzama, SAN for three years. Mr Chris Alashi brought the complaint concerning professional fees arising from the N8 billion consent judgment in the Zaki-Biam litigation, and the representation of certain judgment creditors.

This analysis offers a doctrinal examination of the ruling. A disciplinary tribunal must act within its jurisdiction, apply correct legal standards, evaluate evidence independently, afford parties a fair hearing, and ensure its decisions can be appealed. As this critique demonstrates, the LPDC’s Direction falls short on each count.

Factual Background

The case stems from the military invasion of Tiv communities in Benue State—the Zaki-Biam massacre. Two consolidated suits culminated in judgment awards totalling N41.8 billion. The judgment debtors appealed, and following negotiations, the parties entered a consent judgment for N8 billion on 2 February 2015.

Ocha P. Ulegede was the original counsel. Chris Alashi claimed to have been briefed by certain judgment creditors in November 2008. After initial tensions, the parties reconciled in May 2013 through Senator George Akume and S.T. Hon, SAN.

Joe-Kyari Gadzama, SAN, entered the picture in 2015, retained by certain judgment creditors to challenge the consent judgment and pursue the full N41.8 billion. Alashi’s complaint to the LPDC, filed 7 March 2024, concerned professional fees, representation of judgment creditors and the conduct of the respondents as legal practitioners.

The LPDC found Ulegede liable under Rule 1 (two-year suspension) and Gadzama liable under Rules 1, 27(1) and 29(1)(b) (three-year suspension). It ordered publication in The Punch and the Federal Gazette.

Four critical legal issues emerge from the Direction:

The Committee’s Application of the Rules of Professional Conduct

A significant issue concerns the Committee’s application of Rule 29(1), which requires a new lawyer to notify the former lawyer of a change in representation and use best endeavours to ensure the former lawyer’s fees are paid.

The Committee found Gadzama in breach, relying heavily on observations from the Court of Appeal in Orngu & Ors v Gaadi & Ors (2016). This reliance warrants closer scrutiny.

First, Rule 29 presupposes knowledge that the client was previously represented. The Committee made no finding that Gadzama knew, or ought reasonably to have known, about Mr Alashi’s retainer with the clients. The Committee itself noted Gadzama’s defence that he was retained through written instructions from the judgment creditors and filed a Notice of Change of Counsel. If a lawyer receives direct instructions from clients who do not disclose a prior retainer with a particular person, holding that lawyer liable for breaching a duty of which he had no notice is difficult to sustain.

The maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia, the law does not compel impossibilities, is apposite. A lawyer cannot give notice to a former counsel whose existence he does not know.

Second, the Committee treated observations from the Court of Appeal as conclusive proof of misconduct. Those remarks, including the description of the conduct as ‘despicable’, were made in collateral proceedings where representation was not the central issue. The Court was not conducting a disciplinary inquiry, did not apply the misconduct standard of proof, and Gadzama was not afforded disciplinary procedural protections. In fact, as Gadzama told the Committee, the Notice of Change of Counsel was not before that panel.

The Committee thus substituted another court’s judicial observations for its own independent evaluation, a decision which has been appealed before the Supreme Court. Disciplinary proceedings require independent proof of misconduct. Judicial observations, however strongly worded, should not relieve a tribunal of its duty to assess evidence afresh. Observations made obiter, especially so.

Third, the findings concerning ‘poaching’ and ‘hijacking’ require examination against the evidence. A lawyer may accept instructions from a client who approaches voluntarily, even if previously represented elsewhere, provided notice is given and best endeavours are made regarding fees. The evidence does not establish that Gadzama actively solicited anyone.

The Committee emphasised that Gadzama’s instruction letter was on Benue Development Movement (‘BDM’) letterhead, not the clients’ own. But the BDM had been involved from the litigation’s inception; the judgment creditors approached Gadzama through it. The Court of Appeal’s characterisation of BDM as ‘gold diggers’ does not transform the creditors’ decision into solicitation by Gadzama. Indeed, the Committee failed to consider that the signatories on the BDM letterhead were themselves judgment creditors.

The Committee also noted disclaimer affidavits stating Gadzama was no longer counsel but failed to address contradictory affidavits affirming his representation. Those same creditors continued travelling from Benue to Abuja to visit Gadzama’s office, and the law recognises a litigant’s right to choose counsel.

The Committee did not reconcile its findings with the documentary evidence that Gadzama filed a Notice of Change of Counsel.

The Conflation of Fee Disputes with Professional Misconduct

Perhaps the gravest concern is the Committee’s acknowledgment that it was ‘unable to consider’ Alashi’s prayer for payment of fees, as this was ‘far beyond’ its jurisdiction, yet the entire proceedings were animated by a fee dispute. Alashi’s complaint, stripped to its essence, was that he had not received fees arising from the matter.

The LPDC is a disciplinary tribunal, not a fee arbitration panel. Its jurisdiction is to determine ‘infamous conduct in a professional respect’ or conduct ‘unbecoming of a legal practitioner’. It cannot resolve fee disputes between counsel or determine who is entitled to what proportion of a judgment sum.

Yet, the Committee allowed the fee dispute to colour its misconduct assessment. The question of counsel of record belongs to the court where the matter is pending, not a disciplinary tribunal. The Federal High Court in August 2019 recognised Gadzama as counsel for certain creditors. Whether that ruling was correct is a matter for appeal, not collateral attack. The finding that Gadzama was ‘not entitled to any fee’ because he was ‘not a counsel in the matter’ is, to a considerable extent, a non sequitur. Fee entitlement is a matter of contract and quantum meruit for a court; professional misconduct is a separate inquiry. Conflating these meant the Committee exceeded its jurisdiction.

The error is compounded by the Committee’s selective approach. It asked: ‘Why was the Applicant not called to the meeting?’ and ‘Why was his name not in the Disbursement Schedule?’, then acknowledged these questions were ‘far beyond’ its jurisdiction. Invoking the fee dispute as evidence of misconduct while disclaiming jurisdiction to determine fee entitlement is a striking inconsistency.

Critically, Gadzama never had any relationship with Alashi. Ulegede led Alashi in court and reached the settlement with him on representation of the clients. Any reasonable lawyer would assume Ulegede and Alashi held similar mandates. Why did Alashi not contact Gadzama during the proceedings to assert a separate mandate? It is difficult to understand how the Committee concluded Gadzama was responsible for Alashi’s fees when Alashi’s agreement was with Ulegede.

The Standard of Proof

The Committee’s evidence assessment raises questions. Having summarised Gadzama’s defence, it failed to evaluate it, rejected his documentary case without reconciliation, and reached findings that require further examination.

The Committee acknowledged documentary evidence supporting Gadzama’s defence, letters of instruction, the Notice of Change of Counsel, the Deed of Disbursement but failed to evaluate it properly. The letters demonstrate that judgment creditors retained Gadzama to challenge the consent judgment and pursue the full award. If they voluntarily instructed him without disclosing any prior retainer, he cannot be held in breach of the Rules.

The Deed of Disbursement allocates N805 million to Gadzama. The Committee interpreted this as evidence of unilateral appropriation. But the Deed was prepared by the creditors’ representative and endorsed by First Class Chiefs as directed by the Federal High Court. Gadzama’s evidence was that he accepted fees freely allotted by the creditors, he did not determine or appropriate them himself. The Committee did not explain why it rejected this evidence but chose to say Gadzama allocated the sum unto himself.

The Committee also appears not to have applied the correct standard of proof. In disciplinary proceedings, the standard is balance of probabilities, but allegations of forgery and fraud are quasi-criminal and require more cogent evidence. The Committee made adverse findings concerning the authenticity of signatures and documents, yet no court has found Gadzama criminally liable on these matters. Relying on suspicions, inferences, and adverse observations from other proceedings falls short of the required standard. The Committee also seems to have failed to ascertain who might have been responsible for any disputed document. The Committee’s reasoning on this point begs for more.

The Committee also failed to call oral evidence despite the material factual disputes in the affidavits. About six affidavits raised substantial issues that could not be resolved on paper. The issues concerning representation, documents and professional conduct were contested, yet the Committee made findings without cross-examination. This failure, given the seriousness of the issues and severity of the sanction, constitutes a denial of fair hearing and renders the findings unreliable.

Mischaracterisation of the Appellant’s Case and Denial of Fair Hearing

Another troubling aspect is the Committee’s mischaracterisation of Gadzama’s case. The Direction records that he formulated only one issue for determination; his Final Written Address expressly formulated two distinct issues addressing different legal and factual questions.

This reflects a failure to engage adequately with his defence. A disciplinary tribunal must consider all material arguments before reaching its decision. Mischaracterising a party’s case suggests it may not have received proper consideration.

Gadzama’s first issue was whether, on the affidavit evidence, Alashi had established any professional misconduct. His second was whether the complaint was, in substance, a fee dispute rather than a disciplinary matter warranting the Committee’s jurisdiction.

These issues were not duplicative. The first challenged the sufficiency of evidence to establish misconduct, a substantive challenge to the merits. The second was jurisdictional, questioning whether the complaint was properly before the Committee at all, given that the Committee itself acknowledged fee questions were ‘far beyond’ its jurisdiction.

The second issue invited the Committee to consider whether Alashi’s grievance, stripped of its misconduct characterisation, was in substance a fee recovery claim that should have been pursued in a competent court.

Recording that Gadzama formulated only one issue is concerning, it suggests the tribunal did not properly engage with his defence.

This error is particularly significant alongside the Committee’s other findings. A tribunal that cannot accurately record a party’s issues cannot be said to have given that party’s case due consideration. The mischaracterisation alone would be sufficient to vitiate the Direction; combined with the other errors, it compounds the concerns about the legal sustainability of the Direction.

The Right of Appeal and the Ben Mene-Ejegi Decision

A profound issue, though not on the merits, concerns the constitutional validity of disciplinary proceedings without an effective appellate mechanism. The Supreme Court’s decision in Ben Mene-Ejegi v Nigerian Bar Association & Anor (26 June 2026) struck down section 12(7) of the Legal Practitioners Act, which had provided for direct appeal from the LPDC to the Supreme Court.

The court held it lacked jurisdiction for such appeals; the only constitutional route to the Supreme Court is through the Court of Appeal.

This has created a constitutional lacuna. The Appeal Committee of the Body of Benchers was abolished in 1994 and replaced with direct appeal to the Supreme Court. With section 12(7) now void, there is no statutory provision for appealing LPDC decisions.

Section 36(2)(b) of the Constitution provides that a law conferring adjudicatory powers on an administrative authority shall not be invalidated provided it contains no provision making that authority’s determination ‘final and conclusive’. This establishes a constitutional baseline: determinations affecting civil rights must not be insulated from appellate review. The current framework raises questions about appellate review of LPDC determinations. Can a disciplinary body make determinations affecting civil rights when there is no effective mechanism for review? A right of appeal that cannot be exercised before a sanction is implemented is illusory. Fair hearing extends beyond the proceedings themselves; it encompasses the practical enjoyment of every right of appeal conferred by law.

Developments Prior to the Direction

It is relevant to note that this complaint was not the first concerning this matter. Prior to these proceedings, in 2015 Ulegede had attempted to file a similar petition before the LPDC concerning Gadzama. At that time, Ulegede was on good terms with Alashi and leading him in court; accordingly, the petition emanated from both of them. The immediate past NBA President, Afam Osigwe SAN, in his capacity as the then NBA General Secretary, declined to entertain the petition on the grounds that certain matters were sub judice (which remained the position in the Alashi petition) and that Ulegede had acknowledged being debriefed by the clients.

Additionally, Ulegede had filed a similar petition before the Legal Practitioners Privileges Committee on behalf of certain judgment creditors concerning Gadzama. However, those same judgment creditors subsequently instructed Ulegede to withdraw the petition, just last year, 2025.

In substance, the same underlying dispute that was declined by the NBA in 2015 formed the basis of the petition that resulted in a markedly different outcome eleven years later. It might be observed that the parties are now different, as Ulegede was no longer the originator of the petition. However, additional considerations warrant attention. The case from which the obiter relied upon by the LPDC emanated is pending before the Supreme Court and therefore remains sub judice. Furthermore, the Federal High Court recognised Gadzama and Ulegede as counsel to the judgment creditors and ordered that payment be made in accordance with the party-driven and Court-authorised Disbursement terms.

Alashi did not raise a complaint before the Court or contact Gadzama at this stage, but appears to have come forward after the funds were disbursed. Notably, during the disbursement process, Gadzama and others involved discovered that another law firm, RhemaLaw Partners, had been involved in the dispute and accordingly included them in the disbursement terms.

The question arises as to why Alashi was not present if he was aware of his entitlement at the time.

Conclusion

The LPDC’s Direction in Chris Alashi, Esq. v Ocha P. Ulegede, Esq. & Anor represents a significant decision for professional discipline in Nigeria.

The Committee erred in applying Rules 27 and 29 by failing to establish Gadzama’s knowledge, treating judicial observations as conclusive proof, and failing to reconcile findings with documentary evidence. It conflated fee disputes with misconduct, exceeding its jurisdiction. The evidence assessment fell short of the standard required for serious matters, relying on inferences rather than properly proved evidence.

Most significantly, the Ben Mene-Ejegi decision has left no effective appellate mechanism to challenge the Direction. Implementing a three-year suspension in these circumstances raises profound constitutional questions. Section 36(2)(b) contemplates that adjudicative determinations affecting civil rights must not be final without appellate review. The Direction, implemented without any effective appeal mechanism, makes the Committee’s determination final in practice, raising questions under this provision. For these reasons, the Direction is legally unsustainable. The rule of law and fair hearing guarantee demand no less.

It remains to be seen how subsequent developments will unfold in this matter, given that Gadzama’s challenge to the Direction by way of judicial review is currently pending before the Federal High Court.

It is also notable that the Chief Registrar has not implemented the Direction of the Committee. This is likely due to the pending judicial review proceedings, in which the Chief Registrar was joined as a Respondent in Gadzama’s application. In accordance with standard practice when proceedings are pending before a court, the Chief Registrar has not given effect to the Direction.